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MATTHEW CONNELLY
Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*
Review Symposium: Review by Dennis Hodgson
Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population is an exceptional piece of research that is well written and very difﬁcult to put down. Matthew Connelly presents
the rise and fall of a “globe-spanning movement to shape demographic trends” (p.
18) that began in the 1870s and ceased in 1994 at the United Nations International
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. He contends that all its various
“population controllers” were guided by a “fatal misconception,” a belief that they
“could know other people’s interests better than they knew it themselves” (p. 378).
I found myself reading this history with one ﬁnger back in the Notes section and
constantly ﬂipping back and forth to see where the interesting quotes were coming
from. We owe a debt of gratitude to Connelly for the broad scope of the sources he
examined and for his great diligence in unearthing insightful nuggets from rarely examined archives. Those who think of themselves as demographers will beneﬁt from
reading this book, if only for the exposure it gives to events from our disciplinary
past. During the decades when demography was establishing itself as an academic
discipline, demographers shared many ties with the international population control
movement, from common sources of institutional support to a substantial overlap
in personnel. The ﬂedgling discipline was itself a small policy-oriented entity with
some characteristics of a social movement, and this page-turner does an admirable
job of documenting its past ties to eugenics and other movements that many of us
might now prefer to ignore.
While I found Fatal Misconception difﬁcult to put down, I also found it difﬁcult
to fully embrace. Perhaps this is because my ideal historian is someone who is a bit
detached from the subject at hand and strives to assume an objective stance. Connelly does not want to be that kind of historian. He takes strong value positions
and he doesn’t conceal his advocacy of them. The reader opens the book and ﬁnds
it dedicated “To my parents, for having so many children” and immediately knows
that the author is going to be suspicious of those who believe that large families, or
overpopulation, or high rates of population growth ever constituted human problems, and that he, the youngest of eight children, will be wary of any movement
that worked to induce couples to adopt a small-family norm. He believes in a strong
version of reproductive rights, that every reproductive decision ought to be freely
made by the woman who is deciding whether or when to bear a child. And he wants
to write history from the bottom up, from the viewpoint of the powerless in every
situation: the woman in a patriarchal family, the poor in a society, the colony in a
*Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008. xiv + 521 p. $35.00.
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colonial system, and the peripheral society in a hegemonic world system. I’m not
opposed to these value positions, and it certainly is helpful for the reader to know
where the author is coming from. But did Connelly’s strong value positions shape
the history that he presents? My assessment is that it did have some impact on the
content of the story. I also think it had an impact on his presentation of “demographic
facts,” and certainly on the “lessons of history” arrived at in the conclusion.
An example of such an impact can be found in the ﬁrst chapter, where one notices that the author conﬂates a large number of distinct population movements into
one “global population control movement.” Connelly deﬁnes “population control”
to include any attempt to inﬂuence the demographic behavior of others. So “population controllers” include nationalistic pronatalists, antinatalist neo-Malthusians,
immigration restrictionists, eugenicists, sex-reforming birth controllers, and even
those who might not respond decisively enough to a famine situation. I remember
asking myself whether a global population control movement, so broadly deﬁned,
ever really existed. One might have to be an advocate of the powerless who is suspicious of every attempt to shape populations to see such a uniﬁed movement. So
Fatal Misconception might be a history of a movement whose very existence many
will dispute. I also was surprised by who didn’t make it into Connelly’s large list of
population controllers, especially since the 1870s was identiﬁed as the decade when
this movement began. Where are Horatio Storer and his anti-abortion movement
and Anthony Comstock with his anti-contraception movement? Why didn’t movements that successfully criminalized both birth control and abortion make it into
this history? Perhaps it is because these movements were attempting to control the
fertility of “elites” in a developed society, targeting middle- and upper-class women
who even by this time had quite low fertility.
The examination of the post–World War II international population control
movement, a movement that all will admit was real and had a consciously deﬁned
goal of reducing rapid population growth in still-agrarian societies, is the centerpiece
of this history. And Connelly produces powerful evidence that morally questionable
actions were undertaken by movement advocates. He documents, for instance, that
President Lyndon Johnson withheld food aid during a famine until India adopted a
more vigorous family planning effort, one that included uninformed women being
ﬁtted with problematic IUDs by individuals who knew that many of these women
would not be able to receive needed medical attention if infections developed. All
readers will be repelled by such actions, especially since Connelly so clearly disputes
that any need ever existed to lower these populations’ fertility in the ﬁrst place. For
such a disbeliever in the population problem there is a great temptation to question
what must actually have motivated population controllers, a temptation to which
Connelly has succumbed. For instance, there is no doubt, especially now with the
extensive documentation of this work, that some participants in this movement
engaged in eugenic thinking. But was eugenics really the core concern of this movement? There is also no doubt that some desired to forestall political upheaval in a
decolonizing world. But were these family planners really the shock troops of a
neocolonial movement to keep oppressed peoples down? Were Scandinavian governments, the Population Council, and the International Planned Parenthood Federation
really attempting to usher in a new age of imperialism?
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Movement advocates, especially the demographers involved, claimed to be
motivated by largely humanitarian concerns. They were disconcerted by the unprecedented rates of population growth that arose after World War II from the sudden
implementation of very effective death control techniques throughout much of the
world. This entire generation of demographers agreed that fertility decline would
occur if populations would modernize: change their economic structures from agriculture to industry, urbanize, and become literate. But they came to despair that
such modernization would be possible in the face of unprecedented population
growth. They did not want to sit aside and wait until this demographic hurdle to
modernization was cleared away by the “cleansing effect” of a massive increase in
mortality. This generation believed that they were faced with a crisis, and they convinced themselves that the most direct method of inducing fertility decline, making
contraceptives available to peasant populations, might work, and that, considering
the alternative, it was worth a try. Connelly does an excellent job of depicting what
happened when peasant populations were slow to adopt contraception and some
movement advocates pushed questionable “beyond family planning” initiatives;
these moral tragedies now have the documentation that they deserve. But is it a fair
historical account to contend that the population controllers’ crisis was simply a delusion, their worries unfounded, their real motives largely suspect, and their attempts
to “mold populations” immoral? This case has yet to be made.
Connelly links together imperialism and population control as a way to see coherence running through the 100-plus years of his global population control movement.
During the period after World War II, he contends, this movement was largely an
attempt at neocolonialism, aimed at controlling “populations” as opposed to territory. There are problems with such a representation. First, colonial administrations
never actively supported family planning programs, even when they had identiﬁed
population growth as a cause of instability in their territories. Second, there was
great reluctance on the part of the US government, the major First World power of
the time, to integrate family planning into its foreign aid programs. The movement
was established by nongovernmental organizations with key early roles played by
Scandinavian governments, ones without much of a colonial legacy. Third, the two
most coercive attempts at population control—the forced sterilization campaign of
India and China’s one-child policy—happened after the international population
control movement had suffered what Connelly calls its “Waterloo” at the Bucharest
conference in 1974. The fact is that both India and China were instrumental in bringing about that Waterloo. Additionally, Indian and Chinese leaders undertook their
most coercive programs on their own, without the prodding of the major First World
population control players. Although Connelly ties the origin of China’s one-child
campaign to a reading of the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth volume, this is a very
thin thread with which to connect it to the international population control movement. At a minimum, these inconvenient facts indicate that there is a substantial
non-neocolonial dimension to much of the fertility control that has taken place over
the last 40 years.
Finally, we must consider Connelly’s conclusions. His story is that at the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development, the reproductive rights
movement decisively vanquished the old global population control movement; that
the emancipation of women has led to declining fertility throughout the world; and
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that now “[a]ll over the world there has been a shift in the locus of control in how
societies reproduce themselves.” Individuals are deciding for themselves how many
children to have “with or without anyone’s help or permission” (p. 381). This seems
like an ideal situation, but the author notes that we need to be vigilant. We need to
apply the lessons of history and “oppos[e] all manipulative and coercive policies designed to control populations” (p. 383; emphasis in original). This includes vigilance
in the face of pressure to adopt new pronatalist policies in societies with below-replacement fertility and in the face of a more insidious problem: the “privatization of
population control” (p. 382). Private individuals in India, China, and elsewhere, not
governments, are deciding to abort female fetuses. These individuals “police themselves” and are “unconsciously reproducing and reinforcing inequality with every
generation” (p. 382). We are told that “[t]he struggle against population control has
shown that it is never enough to insist on choice. Choices can be conditioned by
default or design in ways that lead to new kinds of oppression” (p. 384). What we
need for true reproductive freedom is global equality, a world “in which every one
of us is conceived in liberty and created equal” (p. 384).
In this discussion of the “privatization of population control,” Connelly ﬁnally
seems to be admitting that the act of having a child always takes place in a social context or, in Kingsley Davis’s words (1948: 556), that “fertility has always, in every kind
of society been socially controlled.” If this is true, then perhaps as we wait for global
equality to arrive we should recognize that the social context in which reproductive
decisions are being made can change in ways that make the presence or absence
of a child a more or less joyful social occasion, and that all attempts to manipulate
fertility behavior are not necessarily immoral. In societies that have experienced 30
years of below-replacement fertility, the act of having a child is occurring in a new
social context, one in which having a child has become a socially beneﬁcial act that
should be socially supported. Why is it necessarily immoral for there to be policy
recognition of this changed context? Why is it immoral to put into place programs
that would allow women to more easily pursue satisfying careers and have children
and that would have the public bear part of the costs of feeding, housing, caring for,
and educating a child, simply because these programs are designed to “manipulate”
reproductive decisions and allow more children to be born? Is the lesson of history
really that all such attempts are wrong? And speaking of demographers, is the lesson
of history that demographers never should engage in “population thinking,” never
should produce population projections that identify the potentially problematic aspects of current trends, and never should offer population policy suggestions?
While there is no way to inoculate any generation of demographers against the
possibility of being so thoroughly infected by the prejudices of the day, or by a sense
of crisis surrounding an emerging problem, as to do real moral harm, the answer
is not disengagement. There is a more modest lesson to be learned from the ethical
missteps that Connelly has so vividly documented. We need to make sure that those
making policy for others, including policy-oriented disciplines like demography,
avoid living in too small a world. They need to strive for a diverse membership that
remains open to questioning basic assumptions. They need to have multiple constituencies, both as sources of support and as audiences for their ﬁndings. And they
need to perform a valuable social service by fully engaging with the policy challenges
of their day. With luck, when their actions have become history, they will ﬁnd a

